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Abstract: This article utilises the new reading of Marx found in the work of Michael Heinrich to ana-
lyse the creative industries. It considers the role played in the production of value by the labour that 
takes place in the sphere of circulation. The specific focus is on creative industries such as graphic 
design, advertising, and branding. It applies Heinrich's conceptualisation of “social validation” to these 
sectors. This suggests that valorisation depends upon goods and services attaining commodity status 
by selling for money. Value is subject to this validation. The capitalist use of advertising, graphic de-
sign and branding guarantees the possibility of this validation. Using Heinrich, it re-evaluates claims 
made about the creative industries and cognate fields in three main respects. First, it exposes as in-
adequate certain Marxist understandings of productive and unproductive labour and the place of circu-
lation activities within this distinction. Second, it refutes autonomist Marxist claims as to the immeas-
urability of immaterial labour and the redundancy of the law of value. Third, it suggests that creative 
industries possess a significant role in a capitalist economy blighted by a necessity towards the over-
production of commodities. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent special issue of tripleC focuses on a return to Karl Marx in studies of communica-
tion, media, and cultural industries. In their introduction (2012), Christian Fuchs and Vincent 
Mosco defend Marxist analyses. They disavow Jean Baudrillard’s assertion that Marx’s theo-
ry of value cannot extend to culture and media. Against Baudrillard, the theory of value is not 
“strictly homogeneous with its object” (Baudrillard, in Fuchs and Mosco 2012, 129). For 
Baudrillard, this object is “material production”. Rather, it extends to many fields. One such 
field is the creative industries. In the special issue, Nicole Cohen (2012, 141) notes the way 
in which the dawning of the “creative economy” has led to the unfair dismissal of the relevan-
cy of Marx’s work. Scholars do use Marx to understand the creative industries, Cohen notes. 
But they often draw upon the “new” concepts so important to recent revisionist approaches. 
One such concept is the “general intellect”. This gained popular usage with the English trans-
lation of the Grundrisse in the mid-twentieth century (1993). Cohen (2012, 142) is astute in 
highlighting that the “old” conceptual apparatus, centring upon the theory of value, enjoys 
less favour.  
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It should not be so easily discounted. The creative industries are a perfect platform for the 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of Marx’s theory of value. Superficially, their conditions 
are different from the factory-oriented industrial production of which Marx wrote. The creative 
industries constitute a distinct environment and set of conditions, and it is precisely this that 
makes them such a perfect arena for the reimagining of Marx’s theory of value. 
As David Harvey notes (2012), Marx considered capital in the abstract, as a series of ab-
stract categories. This has secured his theory’s longevity outside the immediate context and 
specificities of his time. Thus Marx employs a frame of understanding that pertains above 
and beyond its particularities. But to understand the particularities of our own time, we have 
to perform some work ourselves. This may sometimes involve leaving behind parts of Marx’s 
theories, or illuminating new or misunderstood aspects. The study of the creative industries 
helps in this process of selection. It sheds more light upon some of the things that Marx was 
trying to get at than did the industrial work processes preoccupying his mature output. In-
deed, the concrete capitalism that we witness in our day may be much closer to Marx’s ab-
stract model of capitalism than the concrete capitalism of his own (Mandel 1990, quoted in 
Jameson 2011, 9). 
In this sense, the creative industries, far from bringing into question Marx’s theory of val-
ue, may allow us to do much more with that theory of value. The creative industries expose 
elements of the production and circulation of commodities opaque in the industrial work of 
Marx’s time. The importance of exchange and the so-called “unproductive” labour of circula-
tion are just two examples explored here. 
In this paper, I will consider the role played by what Marx calls the “work of combustion” in 
the operation of the law of value. By this Marx means the activities of circulation. I use the 
creative industries as an example, with a specific focus on graphic design, advertising, and 
branding.1 I argue that such circulation activities bear a greater determination upon value 
than Marxian thought has thus far permitted. 
I utilise a specific interpretation of Marx’s theory of value. This is that of the new reading of 
Marx, in particular the work of Michael Heinrich. This interpretation holds value to be subject 
to the social validation of abstract labour by means of exchange. I apply this interpretation to 
the question of productive and unproductive labour. It is in Marx's considerations of this 
question that we find his most direct engagement with the labour of circulation and its role in 
value production. My interpretation moves away from an intrinsic picture of where produc-
tiveness lies. Instead, it gravitates towards one that describes a process of abstraction 
whereby labour is rendered productive. Although it has a gradually cohering identity at earlier 
stages, the category of productiveness is a standpoint achieved only at the culmination of 
this process. 
I contend that the activity of circulation renders the labour that takes place in the realm of 
production productive. This it does by effecting successful exchange. It simultaneously real-
ises and brings value into existence. It establishes the basis upon which we ascertain pro-
ductiveness. Past labour is rendered fully “productive” only through its abstraction. This ab-
straction is not entirely retrospective, of course. It is retrospective in the sense that the full 
status of productiveness is attained at the culmination of a process. This status illuminates 
the previous movement of this process. We see that frameworks and devices are in place 
within production to facilitate the gradual fulfilment of this abstraction, but within production, 
this can proceed only in a piecemeal, tentative, and anticipatory manner. This abstraction 
culminates in the exchange of products of labour as commodities. For this to happen, there is 
a considerable effort to endow a commodity with a social dimension. I attribute this contribu-
tion to the labour that takes place in the realm of circulation. In this case, this includes graph-
ic design, advertising, branding, and cognate fields. 
                                                
1 I emphasise “graphic” design here to distinguish it from “design” broadly conceived. The latter enters into the 
process I describe at much different stages. In industrial or product design, for instance, design plays a much 
more foundational and earlier role. With “graphic design”, I refer to fields such as packaging design, or media and 
web design for products or companies. 
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I look at these fields with reference to so-called value-form interpretations of the law of 
value such as that of Heinrich. I give a reconstruction of the theory of productive and unpro-
ductive labour that does away with some key assumptions. It situates the distinction between 
the two as internal to the law of value rather than as one of its foundations.2 
My examination of Marx's “work of combustion” emphasises the importance of poles of 
valorisation aside from that of labour. I argue that they should have attributed to them greater 
credit in the question of where value-productiveness lies. Using the creative and cultural in-
dustries as a case study, I adopt the standpoint of a reconstructed theory of value. This ne-
cessitates a reconsideration of the theory of productive and unproductive labour. Applied to 
the economic activities composing circulation, this exposes the way in which the category of 
productiveness comes to light only at the end of the process. In this way, the ultimate criteri-
on of productiveness rests in exchange rather than labour. In this respect, fields such as ad-
vertising and graphic design play a more integral part in the production of value than com-
monly conceived.  
I dispense with the familiar and well-trodden exegesis of exactly what Marx said on pro-
ductive and unproductive labour. Ian Gough (1972) has provided a more than definitive sur-
vey of the literature on this within English-language publications of Marx’s work. Gough’s 
article suffices to reveal the difficulty of traversing this territory. Any two quotes on the topic 
can avail us of two contradictory statements. Such statements resist attempts to synthesise 
them into one unified meaning. It is futile to attempt to fashion the latter from what is a big, 
open book. This applies especially to the topic of productive and unproductive labour. There 
is great inconsistency between Marx’s various statements on the subject. 
I adopt a position of infidelity and incredulity towards “what Marx really meant”. This ap-
proach arises from a feeling that much of what he did write on the topic of productive and 
unproductive labour and the labour of circulation is unsatisfactory. It does not seem to ex-
plain two specific issues that lie at the heart of this discussion: First, the specific dimensions 
of productive and unproductive labour when considered in light of the theory of the value-
form and second, the specificity of circulation labour in capitalism. This lack resounds when 
read via the most sophisticated interpretations of his theory of the value-form. 
In light of these two areas in need of clarification and recalibration, two questions guide 
this discussion: 1) How to theorise the distinction between productive and unproductive la-
bour as an outgrowth rather than a foundation of the law of value? 2) How to understand the 
labour of circulation with productive and unproductive labour secondary to the operation of 
the law of value? 
Having interrogated these questions, I conclude by exploring some of the implications of 
my analysis on two continuingly febrile areas of Marxist inquiry. First, I examine alternative 
understandings of creative work in the autonomist Marxist tradition. Their theory of immateri-
al labour suggests that creative industries epitomise new economic activities that lie “beyond 
measure”. They are taken to undermine the law of value. My analysis contends that this un-
derstanding extends only the most reductive labour theory of value. Understood through the 
lens of the new reading of Marx advocated here, it looks very different. The law of value is 
not a framework for quantitative measurement. It is rather than development of an abstract 
social relationship in which measure and its object- value- unfold in the same moment. This 
moment is the exchange of commodities. The second area of Marxist inquiry I reflect upon is 
crisis theory. I employ Heinrich’s understanding of capitalist crisis tendencies as relating to 
overproduction. Within the dynamic described in the main body of the article, I suggest some 
ways in which we might see creative industries participating in business attempts to stave off 
the contradiction between production and consumption in capitalist society. 
                                                
2 Mohun 1996 is a good example of where the distinction between productive and unproductive labour is depicted 
as pre-existing the law of value. As I will go on to discuss, Harvie 2005 enunciates the implications of overturning 
this assumption. 
195 Frederick H. Pitts 
1.1. Structure 
I begin by outlining Heinrich’s new reading of Marx. I set out the basic tenets of his interpre-
tation of Marx’s theory of value. This relates to the understanding of the “social valida-tion” of 
abstract labour in exchange. I then describe his object two rival theories. The first is the au-
tonomist theory of immaterial labour. The second is the theory of the law of the ten-dency of 
the rate of profit to fall. This leads into a brief explanation of Heinrich’s own theory of crisis. 
This theory circulates around the necessity to overproduce in capitalist economies. I return to 
these two aspects of his work—the critique of immaterial labour and the overproduction theo-
ry of crisis—in the concluding sections of the article. I close the introductory part of the paper 
with an account of some of the considerable criticisms facing Heinrich’s work.  
The main part of the paper begins with an overview of my argument. There follow four 
sections, which chart the central movement of the thesis presented. The first looks at Marx’s 
concept of the “work of combustion” with reference to the activities found in the sphere of 
circulation. It links the work of combustion to Marx’s notion of labour as the “form-giving fire”. 
In so doing, it situates creative industries within the circuit of capital. The second section of 
the main body complicates productive and unproductive labour in the context of creative in-
dustries. I situate the arbitration of productiveness in exchange. In a third section I then ex-
amine how products of labour become value-bearing commodities in the marketplace. I ex-
plore the role played by creative industries in making this happen. The fourth and final sec-
tion of the main body analyses Marx’s discussion of transportation. It derives from this dis-
cussion an account of the way in which creative industries move goods and people in pursuit 
of exchange.  
In the final part, I examine some of the implications of my analysis of the creative in-
dustries for two contemporary strands of Marxian theory. First, I look at the immaterial labour 
thesis, often employed to interpret changes in capitalist work represented by the creative 
industries. Second, I look at how we place creative industries within theories of crisis. I end 
by suggesting how services such as graphic design and advertising intervene in conditions of 
overproduction. 
2. Theoretical Foundations 
Fuchs and Mosco (2012, 135) suggest a few interpretations of Marx that militate against the 
latter’s acceptance. One is “Marxist outdatedness”. This suggests that, “Marxism is old-
fashioned”. It is “not suited for a post-industrial society”. Another is “Marxist reductionism”. 
This suggests that, “Marx and Marxism reduce all cultural and political phenomena to the 
economy”. It argues that, “[t]hey do not have an understanding of non-economic aspects of 
the media and communication”. My approach to Marx treats his critique of political economy 
as a critical theory of society rather than as an economic theory (see Bonefeld 2014). This 
provides a bulwark against dismissal on these grounds. The particular exponent of this ver-
sion of Marx’s critique of political economy from which I will derive the key points of my anal-
ysis is Michael Heinrich. 
Heinrich's work sits within the German Neue Marx-Lektüre (New Reading of Marx). This 
originated in the work of Helmut Reichelt (2005) and Hans-Georg Backhaus (1992; 2005). 
Theorists associated with the new reading adopt a Frankfurt School-inflected approach to 
Marx. This reimagines the critique of political economy as a social theory (see Bellofiore and 
Riva 2015). Fuchs (2014, 40–41) identifies two central characteristics of the new reading. 
The first is that it understands Marx’s theory of value as a logical progression. This is as 
against a historical description of different stages of capitalist development. The second is 
that it argues for a monetary theory value. This leads it to advance an anti-substantialist ac-
count of value. This emphasises processes of abstraction and social validation. It is this ele-
ment that is most important in my analysis. 
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2.1. Heinrich on the Social Validation of Abstract Labour 
Heinrich’s reading of Marx rests upon the key role of the exchange abstraction in effecting 
the social relation of value. This concerns the movement between concrete and abstract la-
bour. Heinrich suggests that abstract labour cannot be counted on the clock, like the hours 
expended in acts of concrete labour. Rather, abstract labour is not expended at all. Instead, 
as Heinrich asserts, abstract labour is a “relation of social validation [...] that is constituted in 
exchange”. Exchange validates “privately expended concrete labor” as “value-constituting 
abstract labor”. According to Heinrich, this involves three “acts of reduction” by which diverse 
concrete labours reduce to abstract labour (2012, 50–51). In this reduction, they are socially 
validated as value-producing. 
The first is that the labour-time expended on an individual basis must reduce to socially 
necessary labour-time. Only that labour-time resulting in value under average conditions of 
production is socially necessary. This average only becomes clear in exchange. Successful 
exchange validates individual labour and the time in which it has taken place as socially nec-
essary. They are thus conferred as part of the abstract social labour, which is the substance 
and measure of value (ibid, 51). 
The second way in which labour is validated as abstract and social is by meeting “mone-
tary social demand”. It is the combination of these two factors that determines the abstraction 
of labour in exchange. For instance, say production of a given commodity exceeds monetary 
social demand. The labour-time has been devoted to the production of one unwanted com-
modity at the expense of others. The monetary social demand cannot accommodate it (ibid, 
51). 
Thirdly, the relative worth of individual concrete labour is only established through valida-
tion in exchange. Here, it becomes apparent whether different degrees of skill can be said to 
be productive of different amounts of value. The three movements identified by Heinrich es-
tablish the “extent to which privately expended individual labor counts or is effectively valid 
as value-constituting abstract labor”. The three reductions, Heinrich contends, “take place 
simultaneously in exchange” (ibid, 52). 
Value is thus not a property inserted into the commodity by labour. It is not a property 
possessed by the commodity at all. Value is instead something “bestowed mutually in the act 
of exchange”. Marx himself points towards this mutual constitution of value. He suggests that 
outside their exchange with one another, the coat and linen have no “value-objectivity”. It is 
only the relation between the two, in which the labours that produced them equalize and are 
abstracted from, that can endow them with any such objective value. A product of labour on 
its own, then, is neither value-bearing nor a commodity. The product of labour is only such 
when it enters into exchange. But whilst value is not determined prior to exchange, it does 
not originate “coincidentally” solely through the exchange act itself. Rather, the “individual 
labor of the producer and the product” meet in a relationship of validation. Here, individually 
expended labours enter into relation with the “total labor of society”. Neither exchange nor 
labour is therefore seen as “producing” value. Rather exchange is seen as mediating the 
relationship between individual and social labour (ibid, 53–55). But this is the crucial moment. 
In bestowing value upon abstract social labour through a process of social validation, it 
brings value into existence. 
2.2. Heinrich on Theories of Immaterial Labour 
Heinrich’s “social validation” reading of Marx’s value theory refutes autonomist Marxist cri-
tiques of the relevancy of the law of value. These critiques centre on the novelty of “immate-
rial labour” (Lazzarato 1996). They suggest that immaterial labour is hegemonic in contem-
porary capitalist society. They argue that it undermines the operation of the law of value, de-
manding a radical rethinking of Marxian value theory.  
Much work in the creative industries would conform to the description of immaterial labour. 
The theory of immaterial labour enjoys much favour among those interested in analysing the 
creative industries. But the value theory implied by this approach exhibits profound weak-
nesses when exposed to reenergised readings of Marx such as Heinrich's. 
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Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 292) suggest that post-industrial capitalism fea-
tures increasingly immaterial forms of production. This immaterial production creates value 
beyond measure. This throws the law of value into crisis. But this depends upon a reductive 
understanding of value theory, which attributes to it the attempt at quantification. A theory 
such as Heinrich's focuses instead on the analysis of value's social form. The central move-
ment of the law of value is the translation of multiple different and heterogeneous concrete 
labours into an abstract average This is necessitated by the exchange relation. Hardt and 
Negri suggest this translation is redundant in the immaterial production of contemporary capi-
talism. The “informatization of production and the emergence of immaterial labor” have led to 
a “real homogenization of laboring processes”. This renders labour immediately abstract. It 
does not, as in Heinrich, become abstract via a process of social validation internal to the law 
of value. 
One can concede the redundancy of the labour theory of value only when one takes it to 
refer to the attempted quantitative measurement of inputs and outputs. Hardt and Negri's 
fixation, in spite of their professions otherwise, is with old-fashioned factory production. Hein-
rich writes that they “equat[e] value-constituting ‘abstract labor’ with temporal, measurable 
factory labor”. This is incorrect. That the conditions of “immaterial labour” witness a decline in 
the latter by no means proves fatal to a Marxian value theory oriented around social valida-
tion. As Heinrich states (2007), “Marx’s concept of ‘abstract labor’ is not at all identical with a 
particular type of labor expenditure”. Rather, it is “a category of social mediation”. This ap-
plies “regardless of whether th[e] commodity is a steel tube or care giving labor in a nursing 
home”. 
I follow Heinrich in considering Marx's theory of value to be a question not of quantification 
but of the analysis of form. In this light, there is little difference between labours of a “materi-
al” or “immaterial” kind. The form relates to the commodity exchanged. Commodities can be 
either physical or non-physical. It is through recognition of this that the continuing relevancy 
of value theory is resistant to Hardt and Negri’s claim of redundancy. Heinrich argues that the 
status of being a commodity relates not to anything material with regards to make-up or the 
character of the labour involved in a product’s creation. Rather it relates to their “social form”, 
namely, “whether objects and services are exchanged” (2012, 44). Thus, to a value theory 
geared towards the understanding of social validation, Hardt and Negri's empirical claims 
look different. The move from a society based upon the production and consumption of 
goods to one based upon the production and consumption of services poses no threat to the 
law of value. The different kinds of labour that these two phases imply matters little to their 
interpretation using the tools provided by Marx’s theory. 
To survive such attempts upon its validity, value theory must come down to an analysis of 
the value form. What Heinrich shows is that value theory in the “traditional Marxist” vein has 
not always granted the form of value the attention necessary to ensure this validity. But the 
new reading of Marx secures the application of Marxian value theory to contemporary capi-
talism. It does so in spite of the changes highlighted in autonomist analyses. 
2.3. Heinrich on Crisis 
Heinrich’s theory of crisis explains, in Simon Clarke’s neat phrase (1989), the necessity ra-
ther than the source of capitalist crises. He examines the contradictions present within capi-
talism, and their propensity to give rise to failings. His theory of crisis rejects the central posi-
tion taken by the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (LTRPF) in Marxist analyses 
of crisis.  
Heinrich’s rejection of the LTRPF has two aspects. The first is theoretical. Advocates of 
the LTRPF stake alot on the direction of the organic composition of capital (OCC). Heinrich 
suggests that the OCC is ascertainable. But the extent of this direction is not. For instance, 
historical limits and qualitative factors place constraints on the growth of constant capital. 
One such limit is itself the reduction in variable capital. Such qualitative eccentricities affect 
the quantitative magnitude of the direction taken by the OCC. Thus, for Heinrich, “nothing 
can be said concerning long-term tendencies of the rate of profit” (2013a, 24–25).  
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The explanatory burden the OCC assumes in the LTRPF rests upon the understanding 
that there can only be two ways of increasing the rate of surplus value. The absolute route 
sees an increase in working hours. The relative option witnesses a reduction in the value of 
labour power through productivity gains. For Heinrich, this is already a much too narrow out-
look that elides the manifold different outcomes that a rise in the rate of surplus value might 
have upon the rate of profit. 
Heinrich highlights the weakness of popular interpretations of how movements in the OCC 
affect the rate of profit. On one hand, the generation of surplus value through the lengthening 
of the working day acts as a countervailing tendency to the LTRPF. On the other, the genera-
tion of relative surplus value through productivity gains manifests in a rising OCC and thus 
brings about the development of the law. But to take this view, one has to ignore the dual 
impact of productivity increases. The ratio of constant to variable capital witnesses a rise in 
the former relative to the latter. This, advocates suggest, leads to a falling rate of profit. But a 
rising rate of surplus value to variable capital manifests in a rising rate of profit. The projec-
tion of a “law” here must overlook the second manifestation of the production of relative sur-
plus value through productivity gains. Instead, the lawmaker must place a one-sided empha-
sis on the former. But a rise in the OCC is decisive in this situation only if the value of labour 
power falls by a sufficient amount. Yet for proponents of the LTRPF, Heinrich suggests, a 
rising OCC is sufficient in and of itself to generate a falling rate of profit. As Heinrich writes, 
“[w]e cannot escape the problem that the capitalist development of productivity has two con-
tradictory effects on the profit rate" (2013b). Thus, the basis for a past, present and future 
identification of a real tendency in the rate of profit is weak. 
The second aspect of Heinrich's critique is exegetical. He uses evidence from Marx to 
support his theoretical claims. Heinrich notes Marx’s own acceptance of the impossibility of 
cohering a law around these contingencies. In a “handwritten remark in a personal copy” of 
Capital Volume I, Marx suggests the feasibility of a situation wherein a rising profit rate ac-
companies a rising OCC. Friedrich Engels deemed this remark significant enough to include 
it as a footnote (ibid). 
The LTRPF issued not from Marx's sense of theoretical completeness, according to Hein-
rich. Rather, it stems from the manner in which Engels edited, abridged and compiled the 
scattered material that came to constitute Capital Volume III. This enshrined Marx’s thoughts 
into a “law” within the framework of a total “theory of crisis” that did not exist ahead of editing 
(2013a, 25–26).  
What Marx did consider “the most general formulation of capitalism’s tendency to crisis” is 
“completely independent” of the LTRPF (ibid). This is the central contradiction whereby, as 
Marx writes,  
 
To express this contradiction in the most general terms, it consists in the fact that the 
capitalist mode of production tends towards an absolute development of the productive 
forces irrespective of value and the surplus-value this contains, and even irrespective of 
the social relations within which capitalist production takes place; while on the other hand 
its purpose is to maintain the existing capital value and to valorize it to the utmost extent 
possible (i.e. an ever accelerated increase in this value). It its specific character it is di-
rected towards using the existing capital value as a means for the greatest possible valor-
ization of this value. The methods through which it attains this end involve a decline in the 
profit rate, the devaluation of the existing capital and the development of the productive 
forces of labour at the cost of the productive forces already produced. (1991, 357) 
 
Here the LTRPF expresses a deeper malaise, rather than being the cause itself. Heinrich 
suggests that we pay attention to what Marx considered most significant. It soon becomes 
apparent that the LTRPF is not the central element of his theory of crisis. It actually “ex-
press[es] something more general” (2012, 154). This is that, in Marx’s words, “the capitalist 
mode of production comes up against a barrier to the development of the productive forces 
which has nothing to do with the production of wealth as such; but this characteristic barrier 
in fact testifies to the restrictiveness and the solely historical and transitory character of the 
capitalist mode of production” (1991, 350).  
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This barrier, as Heinrich explains (2012, 172–174), is that “capitalist production and capi-
talist consumption are differentially determined” and “downright antagonistic”. Production 
advances on the basis of an inequality that ensures the restricted capacity of one section of 
the population to consume. This antagonism is both the precondition of the sale of labour 
power, and immanent within the structure of the wage form. Heinrich does not apply to this 
an underconsumptionist analysis suggestive of Keynesian state remedies. Rather, Heinrich 
emphasises the overproduction of commodities in the context of restricted consumption. It is 
not the insufficient demand that is problematic. This is the basis of capitalist production. It 
circulates around private property, the separation from the means of subsistence, and the 
sale of labour power as a commodity to survive. Rather, it is capitalism’s ceaseless drive to 
overproduce and, in turn, overaccumulate, that is problematic. This leaves the commodities 
overproduced unsold and the capital overaccumulated unvalorised. This is what generates 
conditions of crisis in capitalist society.  
Thus, crisis does not issue from the LTRPF. It issues from “the immediate purpose of cap-
italist production, surplus-value or rather profit” (Marx 1991, 352–353). It is not an aberration 
or unsuccessful manifestation of this purpose, but its necessary expression. Crises thus do 
not arise from the conditions of production, or from the imbalances of the OCC. Rather, cri-
ses present themselves principally as crises of realisation. This owes to the separation of the 
moment of production and exploitation in one sphere and the realisation of the value it gen-
erates in another sphere, the market. As Marx writes, “[t]he conditions for immediate exploi-
tation and for the realization of that exploitation are not identical. Not only are they separate 
in time and space, they are also separate in theory. The former is restricted only by the soci-
ety’s productive forces, the latter by the proportionality between the different branches of 
production and by the society’s power of consumption”. 
Thus, according to Heinrich, the “fundamental contradiction” of capitalism is “between the 
tendency towards an unlimited production of surplus value, and the tendency towards a lim-
ited realisation of it, based upon the ‘antagonistic conditions of distribution’” (2013a, 25–26). I 
return to this later in the discussion, exploring how creative industries help remedy crises of 
overproduction. 
2.4. Criticisms of Heinrich’s Theoretical Approach 
It would be remiss to begin without covering some of the criticisms Heinrich has faced. His 
work provokes burning debate, as the sheer number of critiques published over the last two 
years suggests.3 This article is a defence, understanding and application of Heinrich’s work. 
Thus, it is important to set my positive appreciation against the often fierce critiques to which 
Heinrich is subject. These critiques feature seven central criticisms: circulationism, lack of 
crisis theory, under-consumptionism, German jingoism, lack of political commitment and sci-
entific rigour, “Marxism without Marx” and ignorance of the completeness of Marx’s work.  
The first criticism is of Heinrich’s circulationism. To some advocates of the labour theory of 
value, the new reading espoused by Heinrich is too circulationist in its emphasis upon ex-
change. For Heinrich, commodities have value only in so far as they exchange. Fuchs (2014, 
44) disputes the situation of the arbitration of value in the commodity moment. He asserts 
that Heinrich elides the foundational status of production in the theory of value. But, as I will 
go on to explore in this article, Heinrich's approach emphasises exchange in a different 
sense. I suggest that what happens in production establishes an anticipatory basis for the full 
realisation of value. Fuchs contends that Heinrich is blind to exploitation unless the products 
of a given labour process successfully exchange, but the motivation for the employment of 
labour is to realise surplus value as value. As such, exploitation can still structure the every-
day experience of labour even while it results in the creation of no value whatsoever. Marx 
recognises this separation of the immediate conditions of exploitation and their realisation in 
exchange. He writes that 
 
                                                
3 See Carchedi and Roberts 2013, Fuchs 2014, Kliman 2013, Kliman et al,  2013, Krul 2013, Mage 2013, Mose-
ley 2013, Williams 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d. 
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although the worker is certainly exploited, his exploitation is not realized as such for the 
capitalist and may even not involve any realization of the surplus-value extracted, or only 
a partial realization […]. The conditions for immediate exploitation and for the realization 
of that exploitation are not identical. Not only are they separate in time and space, they 
are also separate in theory. (Marx 1991, 352–353) 
 
Thus, what realises exploitation as exploitation- what makes exploitation real- is successful 
exchange. In this Heinrich strays little from what appears in Marx. No compromise of Marx’s 
theory of exploitation occurs, in spite of what Fuchs suggests. 
A second criticism of Heinrich is that he has no theory of crisis. Recent work has asserted 
that Heinrich has no theory of crisis, or neuters Marx of an effective crisis theory. For Fuchs, 
“Heinrich ignores the dynamic and crisis-prone character of capitalism” (2014, 45). Fuchs 
follows Robert Kurz, inferring from Heinrich’s crisis theory that capitalism always regenerates 
itself. It faces no eventual terminal breakdown. This claim that Heinrich has no theory of cri-
sis circulates in the recent controversy over the latter’s examination of the textual basis for 
the LTRPF. Heinrich suggests that Marx had no complete theory of crisis resembling that put 
forward by advocates of a falling rate of profit theory of crisis. In reponse, Kliman et al sug-
gest that Heinrich has no “alternative theory of crisis of his own” (2013, 2). But Heinrich does 
offer an alternative. He charts the necessity underlying how capitalist crises manifest, as dis-
cussed above. 
This brings us to a third criticism of Heinrich: that he gives succour to the Monthly Review 
School and their underconsumptionist theory of crisis. On one hand, critical assessments 
such as that of Andrew Kliman, Alan Freeman, Nick Potts, Alexey Gusev and Brandan 
Cooney (2013) and Sam Williams (2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d) suggest that Heinrich has 
no theory of crisis. On the other, they associate Heinrich with the Monthly Review School of 
crisis theory. This emphasises underconsumption as the cause of capitalist crisis. But they 
cannot have it both ways. He either has a crisis theory or he does not. Kliman et al (2013, 2) 
highlight the publication of Heinrich’s critical examination of the LTRPF in the pages of the 
Monthly Review. The article, they allege, contributes to the theoretical agenda of undercon-
sumptionist theory. This it does by setting out to discredit advocates of the LTRPF approach. 
Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts (2013) write that Heinrich’s account “is really a 
continuation of the argument by Monthly Review that Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall […] is not the main cause of economic crises”. Williams places Heinrich in a 
lineage including John Maynard Keynes, Michal Kalecki and Paul Sweezy, rather than Hen-
ryk Grossman, Paul Mattick and Andrew Kliman (Williams 2013c). But Heinrich need not 
conform to either. The “underconsumptionist” smear shows that his interlocutors have not 
read him carefully enough. Heinrich is no ally of underconsumptionist theories of crisis. In-
deed, his critique of them is crucial and decisive (see 2012, 172–4). Underconsumptionist 
accounts centre on the “constricted power of consumption of the working class”. But that the 
demand represented in this “power of consumption” is lower than the supply of goods pro-
duced by capitalists cannot be a cause of crisis. This is because it is a permanent condition. 
Underconsumptionists focus upon low wages. Their recommendations in times of economic 
turmoil often fall back upon this as the target of government intervention. But it is a neces-
sary characteristic of the capitalist mode of production that “wages are always lower than the 
total value of the product”. Wages, whether they are high or low, “are never sufficient enough 
to constitute the demand for the total product”. For Heinrich, this continuing contradiction 
may create crises, but not by itself. Crises of underconsumption are not the proper expres-
sion of this contradiction. The contradiction manifests instead in crises of overproduction. It is 
transparent: Heinrich is no ally of the Monthly Review School. 
The fourth criticism of Heinrich is that of what Fuchs calls Deutschtümelei, or “German jin-
goism” (2014, 40–41). Heinrich and other proponents of the new reading place heavy import 
on the weakness of the popular English translation of Capital. It does not do justice to Marx’s 
intentions. Not only are the meanings of certain words or formulations mangled in translation. 
The English edition is also beholden to the bowdlerization of the text by Engels, its editor. 
The privileged position of the original German writings in the new reading is subject to criti-
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cism from Kliman et al (2013, 3). They contend that, “the Anglophone public is often intimi-
dated by the pronouncements of German Marx scholars”. They pinpoint the “lamentabl[e] 
inaccessib[ility]” of the complete German Marx to the “Anglophone public”. We can thus ei-
ther learn to read German or wait for an English translation. Until then, one infers, German 
Marx scholars should stay silent so as not to ruin the illusions of Anglophone readers.  
Indeed, the nationality and language of the interpreter, for Kliman and his collaborators, is 
enough on which to base one’s doubts. They complain that Heinrich’s conclusions draw from 
“manuscripts to which few others have access”. Unless conversant with this body of work, 
they contend, one cannot “check” the manuscripts against the original publications. Thus, 
Heinrich’s conclusions “should not be accepted simply on his say-so” (Kliman et al 2013, 7). 
But why should they be rejected on Kliman's say-so? On the basis given, there would be 
nothing that Heinrich could do to convince others of the consistency of what he is saying. 
Opponents could offer the excuse of the German provenance of Marx’s complete works at 
will, however impressive Heinrich’s argument. Kliman and his co-authors can learn to read 
German, perhaps. But Heinrich has no alternative. By Kliman’s standards, he is bound by the 
circumstance of his birth. This critique of Heinrich continues with Williams (2013d). Williams 
attacks the former’s critical stance on the continuing pre-eminence of the concept of imperial-
ism in Marxist thought. This he does on the basis that “considering Germany’s history, a 
German Marxist expressing such views is extremely disturbing”. This suggests that the acci-
dent of one’s birth is grounds enough for censorship. This insinuation serves to shut down 
any debate threatening Marxist sacred cows.  
The new reading favours those texts least mediated by the theoretical aspirations of En-
gels or English translators. But it also focuses on the parts of Marx’s oeuvre most free of the 
restrictive political necessity of making his work communicable to workers (Fuchs 2014, 40–
41). This brings us to a fifth criticism: lack of political commitment and scientific rigour. The 
new reading, its critics assert, lacks political and scientific substance. In their rejection of 
Marx's political popularisation, Fuchs suggests, the new reading elides the political dimen-
sion vital to his work. Furthermore, it breaks with the scientific analysis of reality that critics of 
the new reading attach to Marx’s work (ibid, 44–45).  
Carchedi and Roberts (2013) combine these two claims in their critique of Heinrich’s re-
jection of the centrality of the LTRPF. They take the rejection of the “science” of Marx’s theo-
ry as an attack on the political prospects of the working class. Heinrich and the new reading 
are incredulous with regard to the purported “prediction” of the “inevitability” of the LTRPF. 
This, according to Carchedi and Roberts “is harmful for the working class and its fight against 
capital”. This is because it is the prediction of the inevitability of the falling rate of profit that 
“gives labour’s fight a solid, objective basis”. This raises many questions. Is the law real or is 
it a tool of political expediency? If the facts change to disprove it, do we discard the theory at 
the expense of the alleged political inspiration the LTRPF offers the workers’ movement? If 
the rate of profit does not fall, does the fight against capital lose its “solid, objective basis”? 
These questions may well be moot. Is there any evidence that workers’ struggles are current-
ly driven by the theory of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall? Is there even a 
working-class “fight[ing] against capital”? The political character of Heinrich’s work cannot be 
determined on the basis of such calculations. 
A sixth criticism is that Heinrich’s reading somehow contravenes the “real Marx”. As Mat-
thijs Krul notes in his account of the recent criticisms of Heinrich, the frequency with which 
this impossible claim appears is “deplorable”. Krul rightly suggests that, “it is incumbent upon 
all those concerned to end this sorry tradition” (Krul 2013). Kliman et al see the new reading 
as “Marxism without Marx”. But this relies upon an advocacy of what they themselves assert 
are the latter’s “own theories” (2013, 2). But these “own theories” are a fabrication of their 
making, not Marx’s. They single out Heinrich as having substituted Marx’s theory for his own. 
This implies that the reader should accept the interpretation of Marx given by Kliman et al as 
the authentic appearance of Marx’s word in the present day. But the authentic word they 
purport to channel is a figment of their own interpretation. At the same time, they deny others 
their own interpretation, Heinrich included. 
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The association of this interpretation with the fictional “real Marx” assumes an absurd 
character. Kliman (2013, 2) claims that the new reading is an attempt to “poison [the] horse” 
of Marxists engaged in the “serious study of Marx’s own work and research based on it”. But 
such a stance counsels against critical inquiry and protects the unwavering acceptance of 
received wisdom. The “poisoning” here is merely the reconstruction of Marx’s work in ways 
unpalatable to the self-appointed representatives of the “real Marx”. A statement such as 
Kliman’s can rest only on the idea that the person making the statement has some privileged 
access to Marx’s work and its usage. As Krul forewarns, we should not indulge these insup-
portable claims. But if we were to do so, then surely it is not Kliman who best represents this 
privileged access. This privilege belongs to those who have access to the most complete 
collection of Marx’s writings. It accrues to those who can read them in the language of their 
original composition. But such claims undermine the spirit of the new reading. The new read-
ing is committed to the idea that Marx’s output is radically incomplete and unfinished. This 
means that its representatives would make no such claim for textual authority. The innova-
tion of the new reading is to suggest that Marx’s oeuvre is a big, open book, to which one 
can bring their own meaning and adapt it to their own ends.  
This brings us to a seventh criticism. Kliman and his allies criticise Heinrich and the new 
reading for their suggestion that Marx’s work was incomplete and in need of critical recon-
struction. Kliman et al state that Marx refused to publish the first volume of Capital without 
finalising the complete structure of the subsequent volumes (Kliman et al 2013, 12). But this 
overlooks the tremendous publisher pressure under which Marx laboured (Negative Poten-
tial, comment below the line, Krul 2013; also see Wheen 2000, 298). He had deadlines to 
meet, both at the business end and as regards the political necessity of striking whilst the 
proverbial iron was hot. Numerous revisions, and various international introductions, illustrate 
Marx's piecemeal undertaking. Heinrich's critics claim that Marx planned to release the first 
volume only when the whole theory was complete. It follows, they suggest, that its publica-
tion proves that Marx’s system was complete. But, ironically, this lacks any Marxist apprecia-
tion of the material circumstances of its production and existence.  
For Kliman et al (2013, 13–14) Marx’s work is complete and beyond modification or dis-
pute. But this changes when the subjective input is that of Engels. Engels's contribution to 
how Capital appeared is, Kliman asserts, a neutral act of editorship. Whereas Engels chan-
nels the “true” Marx, Heinrich, or anyone else with which the authors disagree, cannot. This 
exceptionality rests on a series of argumentative leaps. Williams, for instance, asserts that 
“what Heinrich writes is mere speculation” about the development of Marx’s work. He then 
goes on to suggest that “Marx lived quite close to Engels in London during his final years and 
presumably the two men had many discussions on political economy among other things that 
have not been preserved […]. In the end, we have no idea what thoughts occurred to Marx 
unless he wrote them down” (2013b, emphasis added). The use of “presumably” and the 
excuse that no evidence is available are telling. Williams can only attack Heinrich’s “specula-
tion” by engaging in speculation of his own. Heinrich and his associates have access to writ-
ten evidence of the progression of Marx’s theoretical development. But Williams has only that 
of which he accuses Heinrich—mere speculation. It is speculation steeped in a secular faith, 
and the desire to stay unshaken from one’s dreams. 
The following analysis works against these criticisms. I show the possible applications of 
Heinrich’s “circulationist” account. I argue that there is a theory of crisis in Heinrich. It centres 
on overproduction and crises of realisation and disproportionality. And it has tremendous 
utility for analysing the role assumed by the creative industries in capitalist valorisation. I 
show that there is no one way to read Marx, with polyvalence at the core of his mature eco-
nomic works, and a multitude of interpretations possible to us today. We can reconstruct, 
extract and interpret Marx's work in ways that confound the traditional understanding of his 
theory of value. The theoretical and exegetical resources offered by Heinrich and the new 
reading of Marx are indispensable to this endeavour. What follows is an attempt to apply 
some of the ideas that arise from this reading to a concrete empirical area. These are the 
creative industries, in their relationship with capitalist valorisation. 
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3. Discussion 
The argument made here proceeds as follows. Applying Heinrich’s approach, I see the crite-
rion of productiveness as arising in the social validation of abstract labour as productive. This 
takes place with the successful exchange of products of labour as commodities. It is through 
this that value can be said to have been “produced” in any meaningful sense. This throws 
into question accounts of productive labour, which associate it with any kind of concrete la-
bour that takes place in the realm of production. Rather than the labour of the formal activity 
of production, it places the burden of productiveness upon the labour that helps bring this 
social validation about. 
Rather than anything intrinsic to concrete labour itself, the productiveness of labour can 
only be seen fully as a factor of its end result. It depends upon the good or service it produc-
es selling as a commodity. The good or service produced is initially only an ideal or potential 
commodity. When this product of labour sells as a commodity, the labour performed in its 
production enters into relation with all the other labours of society as part of an abstract 
whole. This validates the labour, conferring upon it the standard of productiveness. 
In making this argument, I agree with David Harvie’s (2005, 61) contention that the distinc-
tion between productive and unproductive labour rests within the law of value rather than 
prior to it. Thus, what is productive of value does not precede the process of valorisation by 
lending it its subject. Rather, it comes as a result of that process of valorisation. As such it is 
an internal part of the theory of the value rather than something outside its purview. This is 
because productiveness is an outcome of the movement of the law of value, the abstraction 
of concrete, private labour as a part of the social whole in exchange. 
This abstraction relies upon the successful exchange of a product of labour as a commod-
ity. The labour that attaches to a simple product of labour the status of a commodity is that 
which makes the product of labour exchangeable, and a desirable object of sale. This labour 
of circulation is traditionally conceptualised as “unproductive” in the Marxist canon. It incorpo-
rates the occupations that I identify as the “work of combustion”. I emphasise the social vali-
dation of abstract labour as productive of value by means of the exchange abstraction. This 
challenges the familiar distinction between productive and unproductive labour. 
The concrete labour behind the mere good or service is not productive at all when taken 
on its own basis. It has no productiveness of its own divorced from the continuum of value 
production. In this continuum, circulation labour plays the most important role at the point of 
culmination, with the exchange of the commodity. Abstract labour is the labour of value. Ab-
stract labour, rather than possessing any concrete existence, comes into being as a concep-
tual residue of exchange. The labour that brings exchange about also helps bring about this 
abstract labour. It does so by making the sale and consumption of commodities both possible 
and desirable to some buyer or other. From this standpoint, it is such activities that are ac-
countable for the expression of abstract labour as money in its role as the mediating factor in 
value relations. Hence, by means of the price awarded the commodity, they are responsible 
for the appearance of value itself. 
The prior contributions of concrete labour can be perceived as part of the production of 
value only from the standpoint of its completion. This standpoint cannot exist save for the 
labour of circulation. This is the “work of combustion” that brings buyers to sellers through the 
mediating social relation of the commodity. Previous Marxian analyses have underplayed the 
significance of this “work of combustion”. But I suggest the exertion of new attention upon 
labour in the “sphere of circulation”. This includes that of marketers, advertisers, graphic de-
signers and so on. This attention recognises the true significance they hold vis-à-vis the pro-
duction of value. As we shall see in the final section of the article, this significance becomes 
clear in crises of overproduction. Creative industries can be seen to step in to assist in shift-
ing unsold stock, for instance. 
3.1. The Work of Combustion and the Form-Giving Fire 
I refer to one type of circulation labour in particular, that of graphic design, advertising, and 
other creative industries. I wager that these fields play a much more profound role in the or-
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ganisation of capitalist production and exchange than some Marxist analyses permit. I derive 
from Marx some pointers with regards to the conceptualisation of this role. Two concepts 
stand out in particular. Mentioned only briefly by Marx, these are the notion of the “work of 
combustion” and the notion of “form-giving fire”. It is through these concepts that I consider 
the position of fields such as advertising within capitalism. I use the lexicon provided by Marx 
to arrive at different conclusions to those that his work has thus far invited. 
In the second volume of Capital (1992), Marx at one point refers to the labour that takes 
place in the sphere of circulation as that of the “work of combustion”. This work of combus-
tion, Marx asserts, produces no value. But the work of combustion is essential for value to 
come about. He uses a scientific analogy to illustrate this: 
 
This labour, increased by the evil designs on either side, creates no value, any more than 
the work performed in a judicial proceeding increases the value of the subject matter of 
the suit. Matters stand with this labour—which is a necessary element in the capitalist 
process of production as a whole, including circulation or included by it — as they stand, 
say, with the work of combustion of some substance used for the generation of heat. This 
work of combustion does not generate any heat, although it is a necessary element in the 
process of combustion. In order, e.g., to consume coal as fuel, I must combine it with ox-
ygen, and for this purpose must transform it from the solid into the gaseous state (for in 
the carbonic acid gas, the result of the combustion, coal is in the gaseous state); conse-
quently, I must bring about a physical change in the form of its existence or in its state of 
being. The separation of carbon molecules, which are united into a solid mass, and the 
splitting up of these molecules into their separate atoms must precede the new combina-
tion, and this requires a certain expenditure of energy which thus is not transformed into 
heat but taken from it. (Marx 1992, 132–33) 
 
So, although combustion uses up energy in a supposedly “unproductive” way, it would be 
hard to deny that it is a prerequisite for the production of heat. Departing from Marx, I sug-
gest that it does this by realising the potential heat-productiveness of the different elements 
involved. We might situate advertising and its counterparts in graphic design, marketing and 
so on, in an analogous relationship to the production of value. They bring about value 
through their facilitation of opportunities for the exchange of products of labour as commodi-
ties. In so doing, they help make possible the production of value. 
I will go on to delineate the theoretical basis of this assertion further. But for now it is worth 
considering the practical dimensions of this “work of combustion” as it exists in the cultural 
and creative industries. One might draw a parallel between Marx’s utterances on the “work of 
combustion” and those he makes on the subject of labour’s “form-giving fire”. He writes in the 
Grundrisse that “[l]abour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things”. In turn, 
“the transitoriness of the forms of things is used to posit their usefulness” (1993, 360–61). 
The work of combustion may be seen as precisely this “form-giving fire”. It posits transito-
ry usefulness in the way described above. It gives exchangeable “forms” to the various het-
erogeneous “contents” passed on from the realm of production proper. It makes these forms 
desirable on the basis of their difference or specific quality. In so doing, the combustive work 
of advertising, branding and graphic design helps organise the monetary exchange of prod-
ucts of labour as commodities. This exchange grants them value and attaches to them a 
price. Without this, no value would come about. 
In his critical treatment of Marxist political economy (see 2002), Asger Jorn develops this 
notion of “form-giving fire”. He suggests that creative workers perform an essential function in 
capitalism. They create the specific forms that commodities take on the market. The basis for 
Jorn’s contention is that creative workers do not make value in and of themselves, but rather 
value persists in the difference that they create. This difference manifests in the plenitude of 
styles, fashions and trends one finds for consumption on the capitalist commodity market. 
Jorn’s creative elite brings it into being (Wark 2011, 89). It is this creative elite that “give[s] 
form to value”, by “renew[ing] the form of things” and creating the difference in which value 
consists (ibid, 84–85). The creative elite are the producers of the form rather than the content 
of commodities (ibid n. 33, 89). Indeed, the commodity as it sells in its fetishised existence is 
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pure form, pure symbol, incredulous to content. It need only be desired to be be successfully 
exchanged in the marketplace, regardless of underlying characteristics. It is owing to this that 
value can attach itself to something in the first place. 
Jorn touches upon something important and significant in the role that creative workers 
and creative industries play in capitalism. He reasserts that which Marx only implied in his 
discussions of “form-giving fire” and the “work of combustion”. Valorisation proceeds not 
through the manufacture of specific goods or services. Rather it proceeds through the manu-
facture of desirable forms, incredulous to content.  
Jorn’s thesis of the creative elite and their production of forms harkens back to a distinc-
tion which Marx himself makes. This is that between form and content in productive and un-
productive labour. Marx suggests that productive labour is pure form without content. He 
writes in his Theories of Surplus Value that, “the designation of labour as productive labour 
has absolutely nothing to do with the determinate content of that labour, its special utility, or 
the particular use-value in which it manifests itself. The same kind of labour may be produc-
tive or unproductive” (1861–63, part 1, online). Thus, it does not matter whether labour is 
productive or not. Labour itself may in fact be entirely peripheral. Its content must be given 
form to be said to be productive of value. Advertising and other such industries oriented to-
wards exchange in the sphere of circulation create this sellable form. This pure symbolic 
form is uncaring about its particular content. This is an aspect that becomes apparent in the 
periodic scandals about consumer goods purporting to be something that they are not. This 
may be horsemeat masquerading as beefsteak or quack medicine masquerading as miracle 
cures. As Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy note,  
 
advertising campaigns if sufficiently large, persistent, and unscrupulous (availing them-
selves of such methods as subliminal suggestion and the like) can sell to the consumer 
“almost anything.” This contention is supported by some of the most authoritative experts 
in marketing techniques, one of whom observes that “a superior product means superior 
in the eyes of the consumers. It does not necessarily mean superior in terms of objective 
value or according to laboratory standards” […]. The most striking examples of the capac-
ity of advertising to generate demand for worthless or even harmful products have recent-
ly been provided in the area of pharmaceuticals, cosmetic products, and the like. (Baran 
and Sweezy 2013) 
 
The particular content of the commodity that is sold is not at stake. The specific labour to 
which it owes its material existence, as good or service, matters little. What counts is the 
form in which it sells. As we have seen, Marx himself implies this irrelevance of labour’s con-
tent. We might infer that the latter depends on the particular form the labour takes, in its 
guise as abstract labour. It is by being abstracted from, after the fact, that labour attains full 
“productiveness”. Anticipatory glimpses are attained within the realm of production. But this 
abstraction is possible only through the exchange of products of labour as commodities. But 
for this requires a considerable effort to create a commodity in its full social dimension, as 
pure form without content. It is to the labour that takes place in the realm of circulation, such 
as advertising, that we can attribute this contribution. 
3.2. Productive and Unproductive Labour 
The implicit tendency of conventional approaches is to relegate the labour of circulation to a 
secondary position vis-à-vis the realm of production. Thinking about practices as advertising 
and graphic design, I challenge this relegation. In an important contribution to existing de-
bates, Harvie (2005) makes the claim that all labour is productive of value. He suggests that 
the labour involved in circulation such as advertising and other professional services is as 
productive as any other labour.   
I wish to go further than this. The parity Harvie draws between the labour that takes place 
in production and that which takes place in circulation is a welcome beginning. But it remains 
too much within the traditional way of conceptualising value-productiveness. It pushes 
against existing Marxist understandings of productiveness by extending the idea elsewhere. 
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But this retains what is problematic. Harvie's approach comes up against an important con-
tradiction. This is that labour can only be said to be fully productive in its abstract form. Pro-
ductiveness coheres on a continuum, of course. Concrete labour is one part of this continu-
um. But one can only really speak of productive labour once value is apparent. And value 
can only be perceived once it has been generated from exchange. 
The labour that makes itself shown in exchange is abstract labour. Abstract labour is not 
so much a kind of labour, per se, but rather a conceptual expression of the social relationship 
of equivalence between labours. Thus, the only “labour” that we can say exists, and to which 
we can attach the category of either productive or unproductive, is concrete labour. And this 
labour withdraws from such associations with productiveness. This is owing to the simple fact 
that there is no way of saying whether it is productive or not, excluding purely tentative 
judgements of its potential success such as performance indicators, benchmarks and time-
sheets. Abstract labour is social, equivalent and commensurable “labour”. It is the “labour” 
that is associated with the full status of a product as a commodity among all others. It is not 
labour in any practical or physical sense, of course. And it is only this “labour” that can be 
said to be “productive labour”. But only concrete labour exists or takes place. Abstract labour 
has no concrete existence (Bonefeld 2010, 260). Thus, “productive labour” does not “exist” in 
any concrete, tangible form that can be witnessed objectively in the moment of its occur-
rence. In its abstract dimension, it has real effects. But the “labour” that it describes is not 
labour than anything other than an imaginary sense. 
By extension, nobody performs productive labour in the sphere of production. In the 
sphere of production, what is “performed” is not “productive labour”. It is not necessarily un-
productive labour. It might be more usefully termed “non-productive” labour, or at least poten-
tially pre-productive labour. The criterion of productiveness does not so much apply to labour 
in the sphere of production itself, but to what happens afterwards in the sphere of circulation. 
The productiveness of labour arises from elsewhere than labour, and to see it one must exert 
a different focus. I contend that it is the so-called “work of combustion” that renders the la-
bour that takes place in the realm of production productive. It does so by effecting successful 
exchange. It brings value into existence. In essence, it establishes the basis upon which pro-
ductiveness is ascertained. 
The labour that exists in the realm of production produces the goods that are later sold as 
commodities. But it is non-productive in the sense that it does not really matter whether or 
how much of it takes place. All that matters is that something attracts a price at the end of it 
all. It is helpful, of course, that labour is expended to create a specific use-value that can hold 
a distinct appeal to consumers. Yet it is not necessary to generate a specific use-value for it 
to retail as one on the market. A clever and well-targeted advertising campaign can achieve 
this, for instance. Furthermore, it is helpful that labour is expended in order to subject it to 
measure. Measurement is part of the process of abstraction, which brings all things into so-
cial relation with all other things. But even here, the abstraction and commensuration of la-
bours as parts of the total social whole can be effected in retrospect. This can occur with or 
without a corresponding expenditure of labour at its basis. Thus, it may be a precondition of 
the production of value that the thing sold should have had some kind of labour input into its 
production. But it is neither necessary nor sufficient that such labour should take place. As 
long as something sells, value appears. 
One might just as easily say, then, that due to the quintessence of its role, the labour of 
circulation is the only labour productive of value. But this would be to adopt an understanding 
of productiveness entangled in the conceptual framework of traditional approaches. Value is 
“produced”, if we wish to use the traditional understanding, on a continuum that includes the 
labour that takes place in the realm of production (see Bellofiore and Finelli 1998 for a good 
sense of this position). But this continuum has its culmination only in exchange. This culmi-
nation comes via those who service the ends of exchange, i.e. those involved in the labour 
that takes place in circulation, Marx’s “work of combustion”. 
Without this culmination, value would not be present to have the understanding of its hav-
ing been produced applied to it. The labour that goes into the production of a value-
generating commodity does not produce this value. As I have suggested, it may or may not 
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take place at all and still result in the production of value. Rather, the value appears at the 
moment that it is “realised” in exchange. Thus, “production” as a category does not truly exist 
until this point. It is hard to see what standpoint one could have from which to say that this or 
that labour is productive at all, except from the standpoint of exchange. I do not claim that the 
work of combustion in circulation is the only productive labour. Rather I say that if it were not 
for the former, “production” could not be said to exist.  
In its focus on commodity exchange rather than labour, my approach differs from that of 
Ursula Huws (2014).4 Huws attempts to re-think the categories of productive and unproduc-
tive labour in the context of digital and creative industries. Huws cites a political commitment 
to the identification of “strategies”. We must develop a “clear sense of which workers are 
engaged directly in the antagonistic relation to capital that characterises commodity produc-
tion”, she suggests. Without this, strategies for the overcoming of capitalist exploitation can-
not be formulated. But to do this, we must locate the “point of production” at which exploita-
tion takes place (ibid, 81). This requires us to pinpoint from where value arises, and which 
labour produces it.  
In common with my approach, Huws suggests that the worker does not labour for “a given 
number of hours for the capitalist, producing a certain value as a result” (ibid, 82). As she 
notes, “just about every element of this simple story turns out to be open to question”. Huws 
writes that the “connection between labour and value” is seldom clear (ibid, 83). This reso-
nates with my analysis: that, taken alone, the labour that takes place in production cannot in 
and of itself tell us anything about value.  
I shift the emphasis to the commodity moment as the arbiter of what is productive of value 
and what is not. Huws performs a similar manoeuvre. She holds the waged status of work as 
one criterion of whether given labour is productive or unproductive. But, in my view, it is not 
quite as simple as the wage-form defining work as productive.  
One of the attributes of Huws’s approach is that it recognises the productiveness of un-
paid labour in capitalist society. In her analysis, productiveness from the perspective of capi-
talist society as a whole intersects with a separate axis of productiveness. This second axis 
is from the perspective of individual capitalists (ibid, 83). The former concerns labour situated 
“inside the knot”. By this she means that the labour is “carried out directly for a capitalist em-
ployer by a worker who is dependent on this labour for subsistence and is therefore a front-
line adversary in the struggle between capital and labour and how much labour time should 
be exchanged for how much money” (ibid, 84). From this, Huws suggests that what makes a 
commodity a commodity- and the labour that produced it properly productive of value- is not 
that the commodity is bought and sold. Rather it is the social relation under which its produc-
tion took place-—the “coerced labour of waged workers, under the control of the capitalist”. 
Thus, Huws defines the commodity—which is always the “result of productive labour”, and 
vice versa—based on an understanding of “the nature of the capitalist-labour relationship 
rather than the fact that something is being sold” (ibid, 88–89).  
I share the concern to situate productiveness outside the immediate act of production it-
self. This is in distinction to traditional Marxist accounts that see value transferred to a com-
modity in the doing of the labour that produces its material substrate. I situate it in a process 
of abstraction that culminates outside the sphere of production in exchange. Huws situates it 
in a social relation that transcends (but is present within) any immediate concrete act of capi-
talist production. Both approaches break with an understanding of productiveness as relating 
to the realm of production per se. For Huws, the market relation of buyer and seller of labour 
power is most important. This governs the attribution of productiveness to a given labour, 
and the status of commodity to a given good or service. In the same way, I see the horizon of 
what is and is not productive of value as resting upon a market relation of buyer and seller of 
the commodity. I can draw this comparison on the basis that the class antagonism central to 
Huws’s analysis is understandable only through its relationship of unequal exchange (see 
Bonefeld 2014, 102). The abstract equivalence of commodities—in this case labour power- is 
at the core of the class antagonism. It denies the underlying impossibility of equivalence. 
                                                
4 My thanks to the reviewers for recommending that I engage with Huws’s work on this topic. 
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Thus, insofar as our approaches gesture towards exchange relations of one kind or another, 
there is common ground in how we approach productiveness. The burden falls less upon the 
result of production than of the social form that it takes. The specific content of a given labour 
matters less than the form it takes over the course of the capitalist exchange relation as a 
whole.5 
3.3. Creating Commodities from the Products of Labour 
As I have suggested, rather than anything intrinsic to concrete labour itself, the productive-
ness of labour is a factor of its end result. It ultimate arbiter is whether the good or service it 
produces sells as a commodity. It is this that brings the labour performed into relation with all 
the other labours of society as part of an abstract whole. This validates the labour as part of 
the “socially necessary” labour of society. It confers upon it the standard of productiveness. 
This is as a result of the good or service it produces gaining its own confirmation of its status 
as a full commodity, an object of exchange or sale. This is a principally retrospective activity.  
The “validation” of past labour as productive conjures a new purely symbolic and abstract 
quantity of labour. This is nothing but a conceptual, imaginary device by which the social 
totality of productive activity is pictured. It helps bring its goods and services into a relation-
ship of commensuration and equivalence with one another. 
I therefore agree with Harvie, who contends that “[l]abour which is ‘unproductive’ is […] 
categorised as such because commensuration through market exchange does not take 
place” (2005, 150). That labour is productive by commensuration through commodity ex-
change is not restricted to the moment that a product hits the market. The commensuration is 
that by which different concrete labours enter into a relationship of equivalence with one an-
other. They thus attain abstractness, sociality and productiveness. This is a process that un-
folds gradually within production and without, culminating fully only in exchange. As Harvie 
writes, “a thing—commodity—is produced, and then it just is, until it is sold- its value real-
ised’. Helping this come together are those recruited by the capitalist, such as ‘marketers and 
advertisers, credit-providers and retailers” (2005, 152). Without these functionaries, the 
commodity moment would not come, and nothing would be “productive” in any real sense at 
all. 
Harvie uses advertising as an example of this. The particular use-value that the service 
commodity of advertising offers to the capitalist is that it facilitates exchange, validating ab-
stract labour as productive, and thus bringing value into full reality. This it does by means of 
the sale of a product of labour as a commodity on the market. Thus, advertising insulates the 
capitalist against the uncertainties of circulation. Not least among these is that of whether a 
commodity will sell. Advertising also produces use-values for consumers. It conjures “imag-
ined, non-corporeal qualities of products”, such as the brands with which one identifies when 
buying a material good. The two, Harvie suggests, cannot be “disentangled”. The brand is 
completely tied up with, part of and implicated in the specific product purchased. We “buy not 
only the tangible good, but the identity too” (2005, 153).  Traditionalist accounts of circulation 
labour overlook this kind of production. This provokes Harvie to pose an important question: 
 
How do we understand the fact, for example, that a pair of Nike trainers costs four or 
more times as much as a physically similar ‘no logo’ pair? If all the creative human activi-
ty involved in designing (beyond the physical design of the shoes) and marketing the Nike 
product is unproductive, adding nothing to the shoes’ value, then the values of the Nike 
and ‘no logo’ trainers will be similar. A significant divergence of price from value is the on-
ly result. How is this to be explained? (Harvie 2005, 144) 
 
Something is missing in accounts that cast the circulation labour that creates the Nike brand 
as somehow irrelevant to value and its production. If the brand accounts for a significant por-
tion of the price garnered from a specific product, how could one then refute the contribution 
                                                
5 Indeed, Huws (see 2004, 97) cites Marx to the effect that ‘labour with the same content can be both productive 
and unproductive’ depending on the relation into which it enters through the exchange abstraction. 
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that branding makes to the value of it? Divergences aside, prices are the appearance of val-
ue and thus contain within this appearance the essence of things, however distorted. 
I refer here not only to a contemporary reality to which the debate over productive and un-
productive labour must respond. It is rather an issue that has afflicted the debate from the 
beginning but is seldom admitted. In Marx’s own time, commodities had brands attached to 
them that brought with them certain sets of connotations to which one could relate in their 
consumer choice.  
This challenges the traditional relegation of creative and cultural industries to a secondary 
position. It is not simply that advertising and its counterparts add a “cultural content” (Laz-
zarato 1996) to the commodity, on top of an objective sphere of use-value. Rather it actively 
intervenes in the latter. The production of a use-value may be the original impetus out of 
which a good or service arises. It furthermore grants the basis for a good or service exchang-
ing as a commodity with a specific purpose or desirability attached to it. But more must be 
done to create this desirability than simply to produce something useful. Use is the basis of 
this desirability. But it may not be quite enough to foster the conditions by which a product of 
labour can be sold and thus attain the fully-fledged status of a commodity. Something more 
must happen to grant the good full commodity status and render the labour expended ab-
stract and, thus, productive. In the next section I will show that the production of commodities 
relies upon not only exchange, but also the manipulation of use in the former’s service. This I 
will do by comparing practices such as graphic design, advertising and branding with Marx’s 
treatment of transportation. 
3.4. Moving Goods and Moving People 
The facilitation of use is a precondition of something being desirable and specific enough in 
its attributes to constitute a worthwhile purchase. Creative industries help create the correct 
environment in which use-value means something. This establishes the basis and around 
which exchange-value can cohere. 
Value depends upon the creation of an exchange relation between commodities (and thus 
the labours attached to them) through the mediation of money. This is, as we have stated, 
based upon someone wanting something. Use-value is one part of this, but the category of 
use is a potentiality unlocked only with the conditions in place for use to actually happen. 
Things will not be used unless they sell. Things will not sell unless they are desirable in some 
way. Indeed, Marx suggests as much. He writes that the production of a commodity suc-
ceeds by “creating in consumers a want for its products as objects of consumption” (Marx, 
quoted in Gough 1972). Desire, and the want that Marx contends it “implies”, are not extra-
neous to the production and consumption of use-values, but rather essential to it. This desir-
ability corresponds to what Maurizio Lazzarato (1996) calls the “cultural content of the com-
modity”. The expansion of this “cultural content” depends upon the supposedly “unproduc-
tive” labour of circulation. 
In Capital Volume II (1992), Marx spends some time discussing the role of the transport 
sector in capitalist valorisation. Marx’s treatment of transportation parallels that I have offered 
of the role the creative industries assume in the production of value. Marx situates transpor-
tation in production rather than circulation. This is because it does not present itself as a loss 
or deduction to the capitalist, unlike other ancillary functions. Noting that “the transport indus-
try sells […] the actual change of place” (1992, 135, emphasis added), Marx focuses on the 
movement of people to commodities and commodities to people. This constitutes both a pro-
duction process and an act of consumption. Movement is a very specific and particular com-
modity in itself.  
Marx writes that “the use-value of things is only realized in their consumption, and their 
consumption may make a change of location necessary, and thus, in addition, the additional 
production process of the transport industry. The productive capital invested in this industry 
thus adds value to the products transported” (ibid, 226–227). Transportation then, helps in 
the production and realization of value by bringing goods to people and people to goods. It 
both produces a commodity—the movement of goods and people—and helps in the produc-
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tion and realization of value—by bringing goods to people and people to goods. It does not 
present itself to capital as a loss in the same way as the activities of circulation. 
The service performed by transportation would not appear to be something limited exclu-
sively to trains, planes and automobiles.  We can associate Marx's remarks with the devel-
opment of a much different infrastructure of activities and industries. Advertising, graphic 
design and branding are similarly committed to bringing products to people and people to 
products.  
According to Raymond Williams, advertising organises the market. It helps standardise, 
rationalise and render predictable the patterns of consumer behaviour and choice. Williams 
highlights the role taken by the advertising industry in the regulation and reportage of the 
distribution and consumption of goods. This is a crucial response to the organisational diffi-
culties of disconnected, large-scale industrial production. Advertising is a device for smooth-
ing and steadying distributive channels. It is a lightning rod for demand, establishing clear 
indications for capital to act upon (2005/1980, 186). 
Fields such as marketing, advertising, graphic design and sales bring products to people 
and people to products. In so doing they turn simple products of labour into commodities. 
They create the bond and the conditions by which it is possible that something exchanges or 
sells as a commodity in the first place. 
Marx isolates transportation as inhabiting a separate realm of value-productiveness that 
somehow eludes all the other activities of “circulation”. But can the same not be said of those 
circulation functions such as marketing, advertising and sales? Do they not perform such a 
similar movement of goods and people to increase the possibility of products of labour ex-
changing as commodities? Marx’s reading of transportation extends to the roles he relegates 
to the realm of circulation. Consumption, after all, is necessary for value to come about. 
Whatever contributes towards, induces or facilitates consumption is thus a component of the 
production of value. It realises the potential pre-productiveness of the labour that has gone 
into fashioning or performing the good or service sold as a commodity. 
My understanding of Marx on transportation resonates with that of Huws. Huws (2014, n. 
31, 106) notes that the “special exception” Marx makes for transport workers may owe to the 
revolutionary potential they possessed at the time. They were at the forefront of class strug-
gle, with strong organisation and frequent participation in industrial action. But, for Huws, this 
“special exception” can extend to “other forms of labour involved in getting products to mar-
ket”. She cites Marx’s statement in the Grundrisse (1993, 533–4) that “the bringing of the 
product to the market […] belongs to the production process itself. The product is really fin-
ished only when it is on the market”. As Huws notes, on this basis, “a wide range of functions 
to be found in a modern corporation can be assigned to this directly productive category”. 
This includes “marketing, logistics management, distribution, transport, customer service, 
retail and wholesale sales” (Huws 2014, 93).  
From this reconstruction of Marx's thought one can see that the category of what produc-
es value in capitalist society is potentially much wider. It exceeds activities such as transpor-
tation that Marx singles out for special treatment. To drive this home, we might play upon the 
dual meaning of the verb to move. One can move goods in a spatial sense, as in transporta-
tion, but one can move people in an emotional one. I speak of a specific sense of move-
ment—to move people, to stimulate emotion, identification, loyalty, desire and want towards 
some product or brand. This marks the truly valorising force not just in the sphere of circula-
tion but within the entire stretch of the circuit of capital as a whole. This applies just as much 
to the acquisition of means of production and raw materials by businesses as it does to the 
acquisition of consumer goods by individuals. 
It is not enough for a product to be made and used. It is then only a use-value, a product 
of labour. It must sell and to sell must warrant desire. It is the latter that gives it value, and 
validates it as something worth exchanging. Conventional presentations see intrinsic value 
given osmosis-like to the object, but what is important here is the generation of meaning, 
desirability, and significance. It is this that “creates” the commodity, if we consider the com-
modity to be that that is sold, and the mere product of labour only a potential commodity. The 
labour of circulation, in creative industries and elsewhere, stimulates meaning, desire and 
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attachment. This provokes the validation of something as worthy of exchange and grants the 
attendant status of a commodity. 
Thus productiveness is situated in the trajectory of the commodity rather than in the activi-
ty of labour.6 There is some justification for this in Marx. In Theories of Surplus Value (1861–
63, Part 1, online) Marx states that “it is not th[e] concrete character of labour” that “stamps it 
as productive labour in the system of capitalist production”. Rather “only labour which mani-
fests itself in commodities” is properly productive capitalist labour. The emphasis here is up-
on the production of a commodity as the arbiter of productiveness. Concrete labour, there-
fore, has little to do with productiveness. In fact, it is the stamping of this labour as productive 
that counts. And the necessary condition of this is the production of a commodity that some-
one has some use for. This in turn is the necessary condition of whatever this product of la-
bour is—a good or service—becoming an object of exchange—a formal commodity—in the 
first place. The condition is that it sells, garners value, bringing its labour into a social rela-
tionship of abstraction with other such labours. It thus “stamps” that labour as part of the pro-
ductive labour of society. Productive labour is nothing other than the productive labour of 
society. It is social and never private, abstract and never solely concrete, and measured, 
validated and brought into existence by exchange. 
4. Some Implications for Issues in Marxist Theory 
In this section, I will suggest some implications of the foregoing analysis for two areas of 
Marxist inquiry. In the first part, I examine some of the alternative accounts of creative indus-
tries given by autonomist Marxists. In the second, I insert creative industries within Heinrich’s 
overproduction-oriented explanation of the capitalist necessity to crisis. Both parts give only 
some pointers as to where my account differs and resonates with those of others. Principally, 
it situates my conceptualisation within the wider field of Marxist theory. Further, specifically in 
the second area covered, it points towards future research agendas, rather than the exist-
ence of any closed, coherent understanding of the relationship posited between creative in-
dustries and crisis. 
4.1. Immaterial Labour 
As Huws notes, the shift to a marketplace of immaterial goods and services has led some to 
reevaluate the relevancy of Marx’s labour theory of value (2014, 81). “If value is observably 
being generated from some activity”, she writes, “the tendency is to search for the commodity 
at its source” (ibid, 87). The creative industries exemplify much of what is at stake in the on-
going reevaluations of Marx’s theory of value.  
Some interpret these changes using from post-operaist or autonomist theories of immate-
rial labour.7 For such approaches, creative industries represent the novel immateriality of 
post-Fordist production. According to Lazzarato, immaterial labour is “the labor that produces 
the informational and cultural content of the commodity”. It incorporates “activities involved in 
defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, 
more strategically, public opinion” (1996, 133). The cooperativity of this labour is immediate 
and immanent, rather than coerced. Thus, it creates value beyond measure. Theorists of 
immaterial labour endow the kind of practices found in the creative industries with novelty 
and inventiveness. They suggest that their powers of value production are novel and in-
ventive in three ways. First, they are greater than other industrial contributions. Second, they 
are immeasurably so. Third, in this regard, they are something new and unseen.  
Let us return to Heinrich’s critique of Hardt and Negri. The critique reflects his conceptual-
isation of the social validation of abstract labour in exchange. Taken together, they reveal the 
                                                
6 For an argument for greater focus on this commodity trajectory as opposed to labouring activity in Marxian so-
cial research, see Pitts 2014. 
7 The reviewers suggested that I go into more detail about how my approach differs from the immaterial labour 
thesis. I expand on my critique of autonomist theories of labour and value in a paper accepted for publication, 
pending revisions, in Capital and Class (Pitts, forthcoming). 
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inadequacy of autonomist approaches to the creative industries. The theory of immaterial 
labour does not capture what the creative industries do within the circuit of capital. Heinrich's 
critique suggests that autonomist Marxism discard the law of value only on the basis of a 
conventional “labour” theory of value. In my analysis, I shift the emphasis of value theory to 
the moment of realisation rather than production. This complicates autonomist claims about 
the advent of immaterial labour and its impact. 
In assessing the theory of immaterial labour, I will focus on the work of one post-operaist 
thinker in particular, Andrea Fumagalli. Within that tradition, Fumagalli’s work stands out as 
an attempt to apply autonomist categories to fields such as the creative industries. Fumagalli 
engages, in a series of papers published over the last decade (Fumagalli 2011, Fumagalli 
and Lucarelli 2008, Fumagalli and Morini 2010; 2013), with the shift towards “cognitive capi-
talism”. His work explores what this entails for value theory.8 
Fumagalli focuses on the hegemonic position of “knowledge work” in contemporary capi-
talism. He associates this with increases in productivity. For Fumagalli, productivity gains   
arise from the “increasing return effects and absence of scarcity” in knowledge work. This is 
because knowledge “is not a rival but a cumulative commodity” (Fumagalli 2011, 86).9 Indus-
trial activities based on knowledge include advertising, design, marketing and branding. 
Fumagalli holds them to be unassimilable to the notions of productivity found in previous in-
dustrial paradigms. This owes to the “general intellect” of immediate cooperative creation that 
the thesis of immaterial labour describes. This, Fumagalli suggests, increases “the achieva-
ble level of social productivity”. In so doing, it surpasses existing understandings of what 
productivity is and can be (Fumagalli and Lucarelli 2008, 8). There are “new factors that gen-
erate the gain of productivity” in so-called “cognitive capitalism”. These entail the “non-
measurability of the productivity of knowledge through the traditional quantitative methods” 
(ibid, 10). This crisis of measure puts at risk the applicability of a Marxian theory of value. 
Value transcends the sphere of production. It is now generated by a novel dispersion of co-
operative creative capacities through informational networks. This is very relevant to creative 
industries such as branding, design and advertising. In these sectors, Fumagalli (2011, 90, 
97) suggests, the symbolic imaginary integrates consumption more closely within the produc-
tive moment. Valorisation occurs not only in production, but also in realisation, by means of 
consumption. Fumagalli writes that, 
 
the value of a commodity is no longer merely definable by “the necessary working time”; 
to the value […] should be added the value deriving from the degree of social symbolic 
nature that it contains. When its immateriality increases, the symbolic value of commodity 
becomes even more apparent. It is on this edge that the relationship between production 
and realization […] is played. The valorization of the commodity no longer occurs within 
the productive process alone but, as the immaterial production has become production of 
imaginaries, it occurs when the imaginary realized itself, at the very point of con-
sum[ption]: it is the result of what we can define the brandization process […]. It does not 
relate to the mere act of consumption. When the commodity becomes a symbol, there is 
no difference between production and consumption, namely: there is no clear cut be-
tween production and realization. (Fumagalli 2011, 90) 
 
                                                
8 My use of Fumagalli is inspired partly by his own comments following a presentation of an earlier draft of this 
paper at the The Dynamics of Virtual Work: the Transformation of Labour in a Digital Global Economy, a confer-
ence held at the University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK, 3–5 September 2014 [website: 
http://dynamicsofvirtualwork.com/hatfield-conference/]. Fumagalli suggested that I look further at the idea that 
creative industries add value rather than merely realise it. I feel our thinking diverges on this point, and here I 
hope to set out how. 
9 Fumagalli calls for the institution of a basic income as a reward for the perceived ‘productivity gains’ of immate-
rial labour. This is because ‘the compromise between capital and labour is founded on the redistribution of 
productivity gains’ (Fumagalli and Lucarelli 2008, 2). But these ‘gains’ contain with them the roots of distributive 
inequalities. They cannot redress the latter, but rather imply and depend upon an imbalance. I critique the associ-
ation between demands for a basic income and the theorisation of immaterial labour in another article (Pitts, 
forthcoming). 
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Fumagalli asserts that this process leads to a situation whereby “brandization” does not only 
realise value, but adds it to the commodity. This occurs through “the increase of its symbolic 
significance and to the capacity to generate a shared imaginary on the part of consumers”. 
To this “corresponds an increase of the value of commodity”. This proceeds through “com-
mon relational activities”. These occur through immaterial production’s dispersed cooperative 
and communicative networks (ibid, 97). 
I agree that the categories of production and realisation need rethinking in the context of 
creative industries. But I do not think that this is so because of new conditions that have only 
recently come into focus. Rather, creative industries bring to light something that has always 
been present within the fibre of the value-form. On this basis, my objection to Fumagalli’s 
approach is threefold.  
First I object to the idea that branding and so on adds value. Fumagalli is right to move the 
emphasis of valorisation to realisation. But the role of creative industries is far more funda-
mental. It makes value possible. Fumagalli can only hold to such a view by retaining a tradi-
tionalist labour theory of value that he otherwise paints as redundant. For Fumagalli, one of 
the “main novelties of the new accumulation and valorization paradigm” is that “knowledge 
and culture diffusion […] become productive”. They are directly productive of value. In this, 
Fumagalli holds to a traditional understanding of Marx’s “labour” theory of value. He concep-
tualises “productive labour” in a materialist way. Hence: “productive labour is that which 
lends its labour to the production of commodities and tangible merchandise which have an 
exchange value”. In contrast, non-productive labour is that which physically contributes to no 
value-bearing commodity. Thus, emphasis falls not upon the fulfilment of this value in and 
through exchange, but takes the conventional path of seeing value as something added via 
labour. Unproductive labour is that which “adds no value to anything” (Fumagalli and Morini 
2013, 5). As we have seen, my analysis surpasses this understanding of so-called 
“knowledge work” such as that which takes place in the creative industries. I move away from 
a productivist appreciation of value to one oriented in circulation. 
Second, I object to the idea that any aspect of the symbolic imaginary and the importance 
of consumption to the possibility of value is new or novel. I see these aspects, and their ex-
pression in the working of the creative industries, as completely indispensable to the possibil-
ity of value itself. They are significant not only in specific or contemporary instances. Unlike 
Fumagalli, I do not assume the increasing relevance of advertising and graphic design. Ra-
ther, I point to the centrality of these activities for commodity exchange itself, at any time and 
in any place. Their role, even when under other industrial categories, is indispensable for 
capitalist valorization. I make no claim of novelty. Statistics testify to the difficulties of ap-
proach oriented around the contemporariness of advertising’s preeminence. Figures from 
Douglas Galbi’s Coen Structured Advertising Expenditure Dataset (see Galbi 2008) show 
that, between 1919 and 2008, advertising expenditure remained constant at around 2% of 
total GDP, with the peak years between 1920 and 1932.10 
                                                
10 At The Labour Theory of Value in the Digital Age, a workshop held at the The Open University of Israel, Tel 
Aviv, Israel, 15-17 June 2014 [website: http://dynamicsofvirtualwork.com/workshop-on-the-labour-theory-of-value-
in-the-digital-age-israel-june-15-17/], Bruce Robinson suggested to me that no increased importance could be 
attributed to advertising. This, he claimed, was on account of the fact that it has remained at a constant proportion 
of GDP throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries. Although this does not impact upon what I am saying 
here, thanks are due for drawing my attention to this. The statistical insignificance of any changes in the trajectory 
of advertising spend in the last 100 years does not tell the whole story. As Baran and Sweezy note (2013), it is 
difficult to accurately capture the industrial activity and resources pumped into each advertisement. The figures 
represent only the amount spent on advertisements themselves. For instance, the effort getting adverts placed in 
media and television outlets. But they may not quite convey ‘the costs of market research, designing for advertis-
ing purposes, and the like carried on within the producing or selling concerns themselves’. As Baran and Sweezy 
assert, for these, “reliable estimates […] are not available”. It is these types of activity that I am concerned with 
here. I am less concerned with the buying and selling of advertising space. This constitutes only the most final 
and obvious expression of a much longer and more complex process of creative work. These concerns aside, the 
statistics do provide food for thought to those who would suggest that the relationship between advertising and 
capitalism is anything new. What the statistics show is that it has been there from early on, and remains much the 
same. As such, there can be no novelty attached to the current state of things. 
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Third, I object to the conceptualisation of “immaterial labour” as an immeasurable cooper-
ative pursuit. I refute the impossibility of capture by both traditional capitalist valorisation pro-
cesses and Marx’s theory of value. Measure manifests fully only with valorisation itself, which 
is to say in the moment of commodity exchange, the moment of realisation. Of course, 
measure arises in an anticipatory form within the realm of production. But value brings into 
existence its own measure by appearing in monetary form upon the successful exchange of 
commodities. As such, measure does not and has never referred to any expenditure of con-
crete labour. It refers to labour in the abstract. As Heinrich writes, critiquing the autonomist 
attachment to Marx’s “Fragment on Machines” (see Marx 1993, 704–706), “‘labour in the 
immediate form’ is […] not the source of wealth. The social substance of wealth or value in 
capitalism is abstract labor, whereby it does not matter whether this abstract labor can be 
traced back to labor-power expended in the process of production” (Heinrich 2013a, 17). As 
such, there is no reason why capitalist measure cannot function as it did before. The sup-
posedly immeasurable cooperative productiveness of immaterial labour would be measured 
in the same way as all other labour. This is through its abstract expression as monetary val-
ue. This measure need not reflect any specific concrete activity in the first instance. As Hein-
rich writes elsewhere, “[i]mmediate labour-time was at any rate never the measure of value” 
(2013c, 208). 
As such, no crisis of measure afflicts the creative industries in contemporary capitalism, 
as Fumagalli would suggest. Rather, the conditions described amount to a “crisis” so perma-
nent as to be no crisis at all. We can still use the categories provided by Marx. Indeed, crea-
tive industries illuminate those categories more clearly than industries traditionally scrutinised 
by Marxists. This article is a contribution towards escaping the immaterial labour thesis. It 
undoes its dominance over discussions of creative industries and other contemporary forms 
of economic activity. Autonomist Marxism carries a burden of precisely the same productivist 
baggage from which it purports to unshackle itself. An account of value informed by Hein-
rich’s new reading suggests that post-operaist claims to have overthrown value theory go 
nowhere near far enough. 
4.2. Crisis Theory 
As part of his criticism of Heinrich’s circulationism, Fuchs argues that crises of realisation 
may blight the achievement of successful exchange (2014, 44–45). If something does not 
sell, then no value occurs. But, to my analysis, this is no weakness of Heinrich’s analysis. 
Rather, this allows us to see, when combined with his understanding of crisis, just how debili-
tating realisation troubles can be. In this section, I will apply some of Heinrich’s ideas to the 
role played by the creative industries in bringing goods to market in the context of crises of 
realisation. 
My analysis has implications for how we understand capitalist crisis. The cultural and cre-
ative industries, I suggest, may play a crucial role in responses to crisis. Capitalists face a 
constant struggle to successfully validate products of labour as value-bearing commodities. 
This occurs in exchange, where value comes to full existence. Fields such as graphic design, 
advertising and marketing help make this happen by endowing products with a saleable 
character. If they are not successful in attaching meaning and significance to a product of 
labour, it will not sell. It will not exchange for money. It will not be validated as a commodity 
bearing a value. It will not enter into a relationship, by means of money, with all the other 
commodities of the market. 
A produced good that sits unsold in a warehouse has no value.11 Value is thereby tied to 
monetary realisation in exchange. It is not intrinsically contained within the commodity itself, 
whether potentially or actually. Value arises in the relationship between commodities, a rela-
tionship mediated by and expressed in money.  
                                                
11 This section addresses an issue one of the reviewers was keen for me to address: namely, the issue of unsold 
inventories. I will suggest that the valueless status of unsold inventories is an important factor in capitalist crisis 
tendencies. 
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An artwork hanging in a gallery, price tag intact, a car fresh off the production line stand-
ing on a factory floor, an unperformed song played by a band in their practice space—What 
these have in common is that they have no value. It is not that they contain some value that 
is either realised in exchange or bolstered by the efforts of salespeople, designers, advertis-
ers and marketers. This latter is the “added-value” understanding of creative industries that I 
critique in the previous section. I did so on the basis that there is no original value to which 
more can be added post-hoc. There is no value to speak of until the artwork, the car and the 
song enter into relationship with counterpart commodities through monetary exchange. 
If valorisation depends upon sale, then, anything that hinders this can produce crises. But 
whatever helps it can assist in their prevention and resolution. Recapitulating Heinrich’s ap-
proach to crisis, we can see the dynamics and proportions of how such crises may manifest. 
Again, we must bear in mind the caveat that this approach to crisis has nothing to do with the 
source of crisis. Rather, it relates to the necessity of crisis arising from the contradictions of 
capitalist society itself (Clarke 1989). 
Heinrich emphasises “social validation” as the key principle of capitalist value. According-
ly, his account of crisis circulates around the ability of capitalists to realise value in exchange. 
Crisis is a failure of social validation. Capitalism’s crisis tendencies issue from a central con-
tradiction. This is between the propensity of capitalists to produce and the capacity of society 
to consume. The antagonistic relations of distribution and property in capitalist society ex-
plode this contradiction. The overproduction of potential commodities by capitalists hell-bent 
on accumulation is an ever-present possibility. 
Whilst this sounds like an underconsumptionist account of crisis, it is not. For Heinrich, as 
for Marx, the worker’s capacity to consume can never be in line with production. Capitalist 
society thrives on an antagonistic relationship that guarantees the precise opposite. A con-
straint must always be in place to ensure the ready availability of workers willing to sell their 
labour power to survive. The wage must always be lower than the cost of goods. As Marx 
writes, “there must be a constant tension between the restricted dimensions of consumption 
on the capitalist basis, and a production that is constantly striving to overcome these imma-
nent barriers” (1991, 365).  
Consequently, appeals to “insufficient demand” as the cause of crises ring hollow. Instead 
of demand, focus should be upon the mass of unrealisable commodities. Underconsumption 
cannot by itself explain crises. This is because the contradiction of limited spending power for 
a great swathe of the population is permanent. It is not a temporary or incidental cause of 
crisis. It is an unchanging condition immanent within the system itself. Underconsumption is 
problematic only when seen in the light of its flipside, overproduction. Capitalism has a ten-
dency to produce over and above the capacity to consume implied in its antagonistic class 
basis. Hence, explanatory weight does not fall not upon the latter objective limit. It falls upon 
the persistent drive to produce and accumulate pursued by capitalists regardless of that limit.  
Crises centre upon the massive accumulation of wealth and commodities without an un-
derlying basis for their valorisation. As Clarke suggests (1992, 135), crises of overproduction 
result from the “develop[ment of] the productive forces without regard to the limit of the mar-
ket”. Crises of overproduction relate to the inability to socially validate products as ex-
changeable commodities in the market. Thus, the explanation does not point to contradic-
tions in production. This is the basis of theories concerned with the organic composition of 
capital and the falling rate of profit. Rather, the contradiction relates to the disjuncture be-
tween production and exchange. The former and the latter have a contradictory unity where-
by each relies upon whilst denying the other. 
As we have seen, the moment of exploitation- production- and the moment of its realisa-
tion- exchange- are separate in time, space and theory (Marx 1991, 352–353). There is a 
distance (and contradictory unity) between the foundation of value in production, and its un-
folding in exchange. This creates problems of calculation, prediction, projection and uncer-
tainty. Capitalists attempt to bridge these issues in various ways. I see creative industries as 
one of the possible ways in which this happens. As I suggested earlier, drawing on the work 
of Raymond Williams, advertising helps organise the market for capitalists. 
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The gap bridged is important. Eliding or collapsing the distinction between production and 
realisation ignores the activities occurring between.12 Creative industries are only one part of 
this. Logistics, salesmanship and so on are others. I avoid such an elision by saying not that 
there is only realisation, but that realisation is the key moment without which value is impos-
sible. This much is, of course, quite clear from the meaning of the word. But I go further. It is 
the moment of realisation to which we owe the possibility of attributing the category of pro-
ductiveness at all. This does not happen in production.  
My account does not therefore refute the struggle and risk encountered by capital in its at-
tempts to bridge production and realisation. I have given a key role to realisation in validating 
past labour in the moment of exchange. It is this key role that drives the impetus to get a 
commodity to market before competition, reproduction, and obsolescence render it unsella-
ble. And it is to this that we can link the intensified exploitation of logistics and distribution 
labour, for instance. Although I do not address this directly, it is an implication of the im-
portance I attribute to the moment of exchange in generating the value relation. Similarly 
associated are attempts to speed-up the process by which goods reach the market. Thus, 
there is no collapse in the distinction between value production and value realisation. But the 
tendency of capital itself is to move towards such a collapse in a spatio-temporal sense, 
bridging the gap between the two so as to abolish the gap itself. Creative industries such as 
advertising play a big part in this. They help intensify the feedback loops between consumers 
and producers. They react to and work upon consumer sentiment for given goods and ser-
vices. 
“Disproportionality” crisis theories (Clarke 1989) such as Heinrich's describe the peril 
faced between production and realisation. Creative industries play a role in helping narrow 
this distance. They remedy the uncertainty associated with it. They guarantee a greater deal 
of success in realising in the market the exploitation that has taken place in production. This 
they do by ensuring the sale of a successful commodity in exchange. In so doing, they ren-
der the labour exploited in production productive of value.  
There are several crisis-specific ways in which services such as graphic design and ad-
vertising assist in helping this moment happen. The problem of unsold stock is partly re-
solved by “aggressive marketing” and the “develop[ment] of new needs” to expand the mar-
ket for capitalists' goods (Clarke 1988, 102–103). The principal agents of this, in my analysis, 
are advertising, design and marketing firms. Their continued role owes to the contradictory 
nature of the situation into which they intervene. The creation of new needs expands produc-
tion in some sectors, “opening up new markets” (Clarke 1989). But this, according to Clarke, 
creates the conditions for further crises. Production and accumulation increase, defying capi-
talism’s antagonistic distributive basis. A new bout of overproduction ensues. Creative indus-
tries once again service the requirements of capital to market aggressively and develop new 
needs. There is no termination of the necessity of capitalism to break out in sporadic crises. 
Each time it creates anew the conditions for further occurrences. 
On the one hand, for Clarke, as for Heinrich, the inevitability of crisis relates to the antag-
onistic relations of distribution. It relates to the inhibited ability of the vast majority of the pop-
ulation to consume that produced. In this, they surpass the underconsumptionist explanation. 
The creative industries intervene against these antagonistic conditions. They make con-
sumption happen and cohere the exchange abstraction.  
On the other hand, the inevitability of crisis relates to competition between capitals. Crea-
tive industries also play a role in this. For Clarke (1988, 1989), the “uneven development” of 
individual capitals and their sectors is a key factor in the recurrence of overproduction. Marx 
notes this “uneven development” when he writes that “there would be no overproduction, if 
demand and supply corresponded to each other, if the capital were distributed in such pro-
portions in all spheres of production” (quoted in Grossman 1992, 118). Owing to this uneven 
                                                
12 Ursula Huws impressed upon me the importance of this distinction in comments following my presentation of 
an earlier draft of this paper at The Dynamics of Virtual Work: the Transformation of Labour in a Digital Global 
Economy, a conference held at the University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK, 3-5 September 2014 [website: 
http://dynamicsofvirtualwork.com/hatfield-conference/]. 
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development, individual capitals seek to gain competitive advantage over one another. They 
do so initially through productivity gains. But, in revolutionising the forces of production, they 
invite the future overproduction of commodities (Clarke 1988, 105). The greater the success 
of an advertising campaign, the more the capitalist brushes against the barrier of capitalism's 
antagonistic social basis. These unequal relations of distribution express themselves as a 
limit on spending power.  
Credit can temporarily overcome this constraint. But, as Clarke (1989) writes, “sooner or 
later that barrier will reappear in the form of a limit”. Stock accumulates in warehouses, and, 
crucially, “marketing expenses escalate” alongside a fall in prices. This is because capitalists 
attempt to offload stock. But prices are already low from productivity gains. They finally hit 
rock bottom as capitalists attempt to conduct a fire-sale of outstanding inventories (Clarke 
1988, 102–104). There is no possibility of further competition on the basis of price. This ne-
cessitates a greater marketing and sales effort to compete with other capitals in the market-
place. The aim becomes to shift more units. 
This is where sectors such as graphic design and advertising come into their own. Among 
Marxist thinkers, it is Baran and Sweezy who are most attuned to this important function. Of 
course, they write in the context of “monopoly capitalism” rather than uneven development. 
But they identify the link between foreclosure of price competition and advertising's role in 
valorisation. As John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney (2013) note in their introduction 
to a recent Monthly Review special issue on the cultural industries, “Baran and Sweezy’s 
take on the ‘sales effort’ and the role of advertising in monopoly capitalism was and is the 
necessary starting point for any treatment of the subject”. In their political economy, they give 
a “central part” to advertising. 
For Baran and Sweezy, “selling what [is] produced” is the key problem of capitalism. Mad-
ison Avenue is the response (ibid). They see “insufficiency of demand” as the central issue, 
rather than the overproduction of commodities. But their analysis of the possible options 
available to capitalists to overcome this problem resonates with the analysis given here. 
Competition on the basis of price is impossible, on account of the “oligopolistic” nature of 
contemporary capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 2013). Only the sales effort can step in to sell 
overproduced commodities in the context of the limited capacity to consume. They see this 
limited capacity to consume as a temporary feature of capitalist crises. Keynesian state 
measures that bolster effective demand provide a remedy. The analysis presented here, 
however, sees the limit on consumption as permanent and immanent to capitalism itself. This 
is in line with Heinrich’s critique of underconsumptionist theories of crisis. 
For Baran and Sweezy, advertising is the most important means for valorizing unsold 
stock. They do suggest other options (2013). But product differentiation is itself largely a 
function of cultural and creative industries. Planned obsolescence is also, in the form of the 
fashion cycle, a function of creative industries. This highlights the way in which creative in-
dustries intervene directly in the realm of production to structure the potential commodity at 
an earlier stage. Over the course of this article, I have placed the creative industries as com-
ing at a later juncture than is sometimes the case. In automobile manufacturing, for instance, 
creative industries contribute to the creation of the car itself. But even this participation con-
forms to the same schema of valorisation that I delineate.13 
Whatever the nature of their involvement, creative industries allow capitalists to shift in-
ventories in tough market conditions where price competition is not possible. Baran and 
Sweezy's analysis of why the foreclosure of this option is incompatible with mine. But their 
analysis of how capitalists respond through recourse to cultural and creative industries is not. 
It chimes with my understanding of the role assumed by sectors such as design and advertis-
ing in the circuit of capital.  
                                                
13 I cover the ways in which the creative industries intervene in the production process in the car industry in an-
other paper (Pitts 2015a). I would like to thank Kylie Jarrett for inviting me to consider the involvement of the crea-
tive industries at an earlier stage, at The Labour Theory of Value in the Digital Age, a workshop held at the The 
Open University of Israel, Tel Aviv, Israel, 15–17 June 2014 [website: http://dynamicsofvirtualwork.com/workshop-
on-the-labour-theory-of-value-in-the-digital-age-israel-june-15-17/]. 
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This boils down to the blunt fact that, as Clarke writes, for capital “to be realized in the 
form of money, […] commodities have to prove themselves as use-values by finding a con-
sumer” (1988, 102). If this does not happen, no value applies. This is an ever-present state 
of affairs exacerbated in crises. At all times, the production of a product of labour is not 
enough to bring about value. The product must validate as a value-bearing commodity. It 
must enter into a social relationship with other commodities in the market, by means of its 
exchange and consumption. The theory of crisis given here only reinforces the pre-eminence 
of the creative industries in the possibility of this process succeeding. 
5. Conclusion 
This article has applied Heinrich’s new reading of Marx to the creative industries and their 
position in the circuit of capital. Using Heinrich in this way allows us to reevaluate claims 
made about the creative industries and cognate fields from three directions. First, it exposes 
as inadequate certain Marxist understandings of productive and unproductive labour and the 
place of circulation activities within this distinction. Second, it refutes autonomist Marxist 
claims as to the immeasurability of immaterial labour and the redundancy of the law of value. 
Third, it suggests that creative industries possess a significant role in a capitalist economy 
blighted by a necessity towards the overproduction of commodities.  
These general observations provide an overarching context for the discussion hosted in 
the main body of the article. I say that what matters in determining productiveness is that 
labour which comes after the time spent by capital in the realm of production proper. Saying 
this relies upon the liquidation of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour. 
As Gough (1972, 61) shows, this distinction is a central element of Marx’s work on the labour 
of circulation. I reject this distinction, and argue that it is an implication rather than a founda-
tion of his theory of value. Unproductiveness exists, but only in so far as value is not pro-
duced, and this is an effect of circulation rather than of production per se.  
Rejecting the distinction between productive and unproductive labour, I would make two 
central points. First, no labour is truly productive in and of itself. Concrete labour is not pro-
ductive of value. And abstract labour is not a type of labour with a concrete practical exist-
ence. It is an ideal and retrospective abstraction culminating in exchange and cohering only 
gradually and incompletely in the realm of production. Second, value-productiveness lies 
elsewhere than in the realm of production. The production of value can only ever be incom-
plete on the basis of mere concrete labour. This “elsewhere” is in circulation. In asserting this 
I resist the traditional association of the labour that takes place in circulation with unproduc-
tiveness. I cannot make a claim for its productiveness based upon the same produc-
tive/unproductive dualism I refute. Instead, I use a different understanding of productiveness. 
My dismissal of the whole edifice of that distinction dictates that it is in the work of com-
bustion that the ultimate criterion of productiveness is both posed and answered. It lies in the 
struggle for successful exchange. Hence, there is no “productive” or “unproductive” labour in 
the usual Marxian way of thinking these concepts. 
Were it not for the moment of exchange, production would not reach full reality but would 
remain instead a mere potential quantity. It realises something that is not yet real. This 
“something” is value, and with its realisation also comes the possibility of attributing its pro-
duction to a given source. This is because production can be only ideal before this point. 
Practices of abstraction within the labour process allow a tentative appreciation of potential 
productiveness. But, prior to exchange, no overarching standpoint exists from which we can 
perceive production as having taking place.  In establishing such a standpoint, it is to circula-
tion that we owe, contradictorily, the category of production.  
I began by noting two shortcomings of Marx’s treatment of the work of combustion, circu-
lation and productiveness. I suggested that they exhibit a need for recalibration in two ways, 
theoretical and empirical. First, “value-form” reinterpretations invite a reconstruction of the 
concept of productiveness. Second, the rising importance of creative industries merits a re-
thinking of the role of circulation labour in capitalism. I sought to explore these issues through 
posing two questions: 1) How to theorise the distinction between productive and unproduc-
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tive labour as an outgrowth rather than a foundation of the law of value? 2) How to under-
stand the labour of circulation with productive and unproductive labour secondary to the op-
eration of the law of value? In response to these questions, I offer the following conclusions. 
As concerns the first, I have applied a value-form perspective informed by Heinrich’s new 
reading of Marx to the question of productiveness. This approach stresses an explanation of 
the origins of value in the social validation of abstract labour in exchange. It entails a crucial 
shift of emphasis, which conceives of the criterion of productiveness as one determined by 
the law of value rather than determining of it. Through this, I have suggested that the produc-
tiveness of a given labour process is an unknown quantity until capital attains the vantage 
point of the sale of a commodity. We can strip away the practices and procedures that mark 
the gradual unfolding of the exchange abstraction both within the realm of production and 
without. Aside from these, value boils down to an encounter forged within the moment of 
exchange. Thus, the productiveness that gives rise to this value is grasped in retrospect. 
Indeed, the possibility of the labour that went into the production of this value even being 
“productive” comes with the arrival of this value in its fullest form. This form is the outcome of 
a transaction of two commodities by buyer and seller by means of the mediation of money. 
No labour is productive or unproductive in its very doing. The ultimate judgement of this 
comes with the success or failure to sell or exchange the particular commodity that it ren-
ders. Previously an ideal category, the production of value is conjured. It has no practical or 
concrete basis other than in the abstraction of exchange. From this standpoint, it functions as 
a conceptual framework through which to assess past concrete activity. Within production 
itself, tools of abstraction attain early glimpses of this standpoint. But, in the final instance, 
production is a category not of the realm of production but of the sphere of circulation. 
How then to situate the labour of circulation—Marx’s “work of combustion”—within this 
systematisation? How to think of this labour in the context of the arbitration of productiveness 
within the operation of the law of value? In response to the second question delineated 
above, I say that the work of combustion that occurs in circulation is not, as Marx suggested, 
unproductive of value. But the possibility of my making such a claim relies upon having done 
away with the very metric by which Marx evaluated the productiveness of one type of labour 
or another. Creative industries are productive not on the basis set forth by the traditional 
Marxist understanding of productiveness. They are “productive” on a more profound level. In 
creating the conditions whereby value can be “realised”, they create the conditions upon 
which can be said to be “produced” at all. This does not constitute an argument for the appli-
cation of the classical definition of productiveness to the creative industries. Rather I suggest 
that creative industries intervene directly in the possibility of the category of productiveness 
itself. They assist in its attachment to the labour that has generated a given good or service. 
The role of circulation labour such as graphic design and advertising within this is to cre-
ate saleable commodities out of the simple products of labour. They attach to pre-existing 
use-values another layer of significance, which styles them in such a way to attract the desire 
and wants of consumers. They create new use-values by creating new needs where neither 
were present before. Without this, there is a lessened likelihood of exchange, and without 
exchange, the impossibility of value. In this respect, creative industries are as crucial rather 
than peripheral to capitalist valorisation. 
Value is a social relation rather than something intrinsic to labour and its product. The lat-
ter is not by some miracle endowed with a valuable quality by the former. Some other expla-
nation of from where it derives must be sought. Circulation provides a more plausible alibi. It 
establishes the frontier and criteria of what is productive and what is not, by bringing about 
the conditions whereby value is established. Without value, of what can we claim any kind of 
labour to have been productive? The labour of circulation is not the only “productive” labour. 
It plays a more significant role than this. It makes possible the productiveness of all other 
labour not through producing itself, but by realising something that was once only ideal. It 
thereby makes possible the abstraction we call production.  
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